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Abstract
In this paper the problem of analyticity and cognitive synonymy will be scrutinised following Quine’s
path. The analysis will differ in two essential points from the usual analysis. First, not only one
sentence but set of sentences will be taken into consideration. Second, the language will be studied
not in a static state but in a dynamic process. I am going to examine also the change of the truth value,
when a linguistic system has to incorporate a new fact of the extralinguistic world. This will suggest
us that the language can be pictured rather as a net than as a tree.
Keywords: interchangeability, extensional language, language of science, meaning and empirical
analysis.
1. Introduction
Quine in his famous essay ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’ which was decisive in
the philosophy of science rejects that there is difference between truths which are
analytic, or grounded in meanings independently of matters of fact, and truths which
are synthetic, or grounded in fact (QUINE 1961a. p. 20). Quine accepts that truth in
general depends on both language and extralinguistic facts, but he also refuses that
the truth of a statement is somehow analyzable into a linguistic component and a
factual component (QUINE 1961a. p. 36). Accordingly he denies that the statements
can be separated into two classes, such as that of analytic statements and that of
synthetic ones. Due to Quine’s analysis it is quite plausible that a statement, like ‘No
bachelor is married’ cannot be accepted as an analytic one without understanding
and presupposing its ‘meaning’. But if this is the case the problem of analyticity is
not solved only reduced to the notion of meaning. Starting with meaning to solve
the problem of analyticity it seems to be unavoidable to refer to the synonymy of
two terms: ‘bachelor’ and ‘married man’. They are synonymous and it is why their
meanings are the same helping us to reduce analytic statements to logical truth.
Then Quine scrutinises the assumption that synonymy of two linguistic terms
consists only in their interchangeability in all contexts without change of truths
value (QUINE 1961a. p. 27). But interchangeability is senseless until relativized
to a language whose extent is specified in relevant respects. However, in some
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kinds of language – called extensional language – the extensions of two terms like
‘bachelor’ and ‘married man’ correspond to each other, as e.g. ‘creature with a heart’
and ‘creature with kidneys’. But we would consider as synonyms only the former
pair of terms, while we think the latter pair consists of heteronymous expressions.
Quine argues that in an extensional language, therefore, interchangeability salva
veritate is no assurance of cognitive synonymy of the desired type (QUINE 1961b.
p. 51), because it allows heteronym expressions to be interchanged. Note that
giving the extensions of terms in advance is nothing else than taking extralinguistic
facts into consideration, or, otherwise, examination of the relationship between a
language and a presupposed extralinguistic reality. This examination is cognition
or observation itself. Extensionality guaranteed this way makes both the meaning
and the analyticity senseless again. We can agree with Quine that the sameness of
extensions of two terms in an extensional language inform us about this observation
or cognitive synonymy recognised this way. This shows clearly why and from what
a view the presupposed extensional language of science cannot be adequate. This
presupposed extensionality leads to typical problems of philosophy of science,
concerning observation. More explicitly states it Quine later (QUINE 1961b. p. 60)
that ‘the problem of finding relevant respects is, if we think of the matter in a
sufficiently oversimplified way, a problem typical of empirical science’. This is
why HEMPEL’s (1952) assumption that ‘empirical analysis and meaning analysis
differ from each other and from nominal definition’ is not right. Hempel claims that
empirical analysis is concerned not with linguistic expressions and their meanings
but with empirical phenomena, while nominal definition and meaning analysis deal
with the meanings of linguistic expressions (HEMPEL 1952 p. 11–12). Now let
us spend some time to examine it in order to shed light on their connections with
cognitive synonymy.
Nominal definition introduces a new expression and gives its meaning by stip-
ulation, while analytic definition is concerned with an expression which is already
in use (HEMPEL 1952 p. 11). HEMPEL’s own example is the following:
Let the ‘tiglon’ be short for (i.e. synonymous with) the phrase ‘offspring of
a male tiger and a female lion’.
This nominal definition fulfils its function only in this special form presented
above. It must be stated again and again for every person entering into the language-
using community, which repeating is a permanent re-naming. Two actors of the
community who have not met yet and are aware of the nominal definition of ‘tiglon’
cannot use it immediately, otherwise it would be a word in use and following from
this an analytic definition or meaning analysis would be possible. When one of
them would use the word ‘tiglon’ he cannot lean on what the other has in mind by
the same nominal definition. But checking the nominal definition against another
is nothing else than claiming it again. The nominal definition can only capture the
moment of introducing a new word, but without its special form any word introduced
in this manner is as problematic as any other word. But, we must not forget that
Hempel assumes there are undefined and unproblematic elements of a language.
At this moment Quine’s argument can be brought up again, namely who defined
them thus, and when? At the bottom of a language the same question appears.
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Let us suppose a language-using community whose every actor is aware of
the definition of the word ‘tiglon’. Now let a new actor enter into the linguistic
community, but the nominal definition of tiglon is not yet introduced to him. He
can observe other actors of community using the word ‘tiglon’, and let us allow
him to understand the expression of ‘offspring of a male tiger and a female lion’.
Suppose that the new actor claiming that not only in relevant, but in all respects,
in all linguistic and extralinguistic contexts has observed, has found an extensional
coincidence of the expressions. This agreement has been discovered in this ideal
case as cognitive synonymy. But these assumptions, ideal observational possibilities
and good abilities of the new actor do not allow him to claim that ‘tiglon’ has been
introduced with nominal definition. Its status cannot be restored. The new actor has
had a finite observational basis, so he cannot be sure that it does not exist a situation
in which he would find differences in using the examined expressions. This is why
empirical analysis does not differ from meaning analysis.
If we cannot restrict ourselves to using an extensional language, then there is
no guarantee that extensional agreement of ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried man’ rests
on meaning rather than merely accidental matters of fact (QUINE 1961a. p. 30).
Quine does not explain in detail this ‘merely accidental matters of fact’ in the case
of ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried man’. However, it seems to be difficult to imagine
what could be accidental in their extensional agreement and it is worth giving an
example when terms considered as synonyms are not synonyms anymore. Now my
aim is to show what are contingent matters of fact in the extensional agreement of
‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried man’.
2. Has Science a Special Language?
Quine in his essay studies some sentences taken from natural language to throw
light on the problem of analyticity. Why could these statements be relevant in the
philosophy of science at all? Now we are at an important question which often
occurs explicitly or implicitly in the philosophy of science: does the language of
science differ from natural language? If it does then in what degree and from what a
point of view? Quine implicitly refuses that there are differences between everyday
and scientific language. It was a common opinion that the difficulty in separating
analytic statements from synthetic ones in ordinary language is due to the vagueness
of ordinary language and the distinction is clear when we have a precise artificial
language (QUINE 1961a. p. 32). This artificial language would be the language
of science. The language of science, be of natural science or of mathematics, was
often opposed to ordinary language. The latter is accused not only with vagueness,
but with ambiguity and inconsistency of usage. Let us turn again to Hempel to
see in details in what the opposition consists. He admits that ‘the conception of
analytic definition or statement presupposes a language whose expressions have
precisely determined meanings – so that any two of its expressions can be said
either to be, or not to be, synonymous’. As he assumes this condition is met at
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best by certain artificial languages and surely is not satisfied by ordinary ones. He
overlooks this presupposition and does not try to verify or give an argument why he
thinks the meanings of expressions of the language of science precisely determined.
Hempel disregards ambiguity because he probably thinks it not to be relevant in
the language of science at all. Ambiguity of a word for him is ‘having several
distinct meanings’. Presumably what he has in mind is the following: in ordinary
language we use the same term for different things, for example ‘light’ may mean
now the opposite of ‘dark’, then the opposite of ‘heavy’. But this never can happen
in science according to Hempel. So disregarding the ambiguity there remains the
problem of vagueness – lack of determinacy – and inconsistency of usage. He
assumes that the language of science satisfies these presuppositions. Maybe in
physics it is no problem to decide what is electron and what is not. But not so
easy to tell in everyday language what is a hat and what is not. This problem was
characterised by him as the notion of everyday language has no sharp, well-defined
boundary opposite to language of science. But I hope we can see at the end of our
studies why Hempel’s characterisation is not right.
There is a background assumption that science has already a special language
free from the problems mentioned. If it were yet not the case then it can be hoped it
will have. An artificial language can be given to science or the science would reach
this special condition not inheriting the troubled features of ordinary language. But
a tacit supposition lurks here again. It is supposed that all the linguistic features of
an artificial language such as analyticity can be understood within that language, not
given from outside, in the everyday language. The notion of analyticity is a relation
between statements and languages, and this relation has to be given universally and
independently of any particular language, otherwise, interpreting and separating
analytic statements is not within that language, but outside of it in an everyday
language. In this latter case all the sentences of an everyday language which are
used in advance to separate analytic statements should count rather as those of the
scientific language than of the everyday one. This shows the presupposed but not
cleared up notion of analyticity is used. Anyway, if it is impossible to give a good,
clear argument or solution to the problem of meaning, analyticity, synonymy and
definition for a natural language we cannot hope or assume that it can be given to
a scientific one. This is why in this paper I am going to use the same illustrative
sentences as were by Quine. – ‘No bachelor is married’ and ‘No unmarried man is
married’.
3. Showing Contingency
In the following part of my paper I will scrutinise the problem of analyticity and
extensional coincidence starting with interchangeability and cognitive synonymy.
I will apply a simplification in order that the set of men can be divided into
two disjunctive and exhaustive subsets unambiguously, a subset of bachelors and a
subset of married men. With this simplification my aim is to disregard such problems
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as that whether a widow, a divorced or a young man is a bachelor or not. Sharpening
the boundaries of the notions and making the model simple enough we can eliminate
the charges brought up by Hempel. Since in my model the borderline of the notion is
well-defined and clear-cut, Hempel’s argument concerning the lack of determinacy
and inconsistency of usage can be rejected. This model helps us to see that problems
occurring without vagueness show another sort of inadequacy of the traditional idea
of language. I will argue that there are some background assumptions or facts that
are fixed or built in the language. One of these assumptions will be a social one in
our case. The changing presupposed extralinguistic facts are to show what is this
assumption and how the language really works. The problem and the connections
amongst analyticity, meaning, cognitive synonymy and definition can be seen in
a dynamic process not in a static state of a language. This analysis will confirm
Quine’s numerous findings and some can be specified or modified.
Let us examine Quine’s illustrative sentence further. The married-unmarried
conceptual counterpart can be or is related to the following concepts: husband-
wife conceptual counterpart and bachelor. At the present state of the European
community the following concepts are cognitive synonyms and interchangeable
without changing the truth values: husband = married man = a man having a wife
= not bachelor. Some of the expressions sound strange at this moment because
they are rarely used in this way or mean the same. This is grounded on the tacit and
socially determined fact that marriage is taken to be possible only between a man
and a woman. This is the contingent matter of fact that causes the coincidences of
extensions mentioned above. Then at this state of a European society we can claim
the following sentences with their truth values (Fig. 1)
(1) No bachelor is married man. True
(2) No bachelor is husband. True
(3) All married men are husbands. True
(4) All married men have wife. True
(5) All husbands have wife. True
(6) There is a man not bachelor and not husband. False
I have taken full advantage of the simplification mentioned above to divide
the set of men into two disjunctive and exhaustive subsets. One of them is a subset
of bachelors or set of unmarried men, while the other is a set of married men or set
of husbands. Sentences (1), (2) and (6) are about bachelors, while statements (1),
(3) and (4) are about married men. Till now it would be very difficult to deny any of
them. Accepting cognitive synonymy or interchangeability this allows us to verify
the truth value of the sentences. I think, if there are analytic statements we have no
reason to deny sentences (1)–(6) as analytic ones. Note, however, that some of the
sentences are not only about the synonymy of terms studied by Quine, but others
which are connected with these ones.
Let us suppose now the society to make marriage possible between men,
which, I think, is not quite inconceivable. We have a possibility to create a sub-
set inside the set of married men but apart from the set of bachelors. Choosing
this possibility not every uncertainty can be eliminated and in consequence, the
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Fig. 1. The starting condition in the present state of the community
incorporation of a new fact cannot be made in one step. As it can be seen the
extensional agreement of ‘married men’ and ‘husbands’ has got into trouble. The
meaning of them have to be reinterpreted. Since having made a decision once to
choose this possibility was not enough to eliminate every uncertainties, we must
decide again whether mostly the synonymy of ‘married man’ and ‘husband’ should
remain the same (in Case#3) or the definition of ‘husband’ (a man in marriage with
a woman) should be kept true (in Case#2). It is shown on Fig. 2 and Fig. 3, with
their interpretations in Table 1. If we look at Table 1, the truth values of the first
two statements remain unchanged, sentence (4) has changed in both Case#2 and
Case#3, while sentences (3), (5) and (6) have changed in the opposite direction to
each other in Case#2 and Case#3. But as it can be seen not only one truth value has
changed in any case. If it is important for us that sentence (3) or the component of
the meaning captured in this statement must be true, then we should choose Case#3,
but if sentence (5) should be taken to be true then Case#2. (I asked some of my
friends and they gave different answers that should be kept true.) Extensions of two
terms formerly considered as synonyms have come apart. This supports Quine’s
argument namely extensional agreement of two terms does not guarantee that it
depends on their meaning rather than grounded in the accidental matters of fact.
Fig. 2. The new subset created in order to save the meaning of ‘bachelors’ and ‘husbands’
Contrary to the previous case there is another possibility to create a subset
but not apart from the set of bachelors. Inasmuch as sentence (1) is taken alone
as definition or analytic statement, it does not claim anything about the connection
between ‘bachelor’ and ‘man living in a marriage with another man’. Statement (1)
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Table 1. Distribution and change of the truth values in the examined cases
Case#1 Case#2 Case#3 Case#4 Case#5
No bachelor is married. 1 1 1 0 0
No bachelor is a husband. 1 1 1 1 0
All married men are hus-
bands.
1 0 1 0 1
All married men have wife. 1 0 0 0 0
All husbands have wife. 1 1 0 1 0
There is a man not bachelor
and not husband.
0 1 0 0 0
Change of truth values com-
pared to the starting condition
(Case#1)
– 3 2 3 4
or any other statement itself does not govern the meaning of bachelor in a dynamic
process. So we should turn to other statements to get the whole meaning of a term
or accept vagueness or uncertainty of a term concerning a new situation. But this is
not the traditional picture of language. What sort of arguments can be brought up
for the sake of this case will be studied later. As above there are two possibilities
again to choose the synonymy to remain untouched, but one of them has to be given
up. Now let us see as Case#4 and Case#5 on Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 with their truth values
in Table 1.
Fig. 3. The new subset created in order to save the synonymy of ‘husbands’ and ‘married
men’
Note that, first of all, we do not have one and only one possibility to handle
this problematic situation.
Table 1 shows well the distribution and the change of truth values in all cases
compared to the starting condition. The least radical changes occur in Case#2 and
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Case#3, when a new subset is apart from bachelors, and Case#3 seems to be the best
currently. In Case#3 the truth values of statements concerning mainly ‘bachelor’
remained the same, whereas it cannot be said for statements concerning ‘married
man’ or ‘husband’. Now there could be an opinion that there is a best case, and
in the best case there is a term (bachelor) the meaning of which seized in sentence
(1) or (2) is unchanged. But this is an illusion, and it does not save analyticity at
all. If we had started the consideration with choosing sentences out concerning the
term ‘husband’, then Case#3 would not have been as good as in case of ‘bachelor’.
In Case#3 the synonymy of ‘unmarried man’ and ‘bachelor’ is saved in the first
step, and after that for the sake of saving the synonymy and extensional agreement
of ‘husband’ and ‘married man’, but at the expense of giving up the component
of meaning of husband (a man having a wife). It is uncertain that how many and
which sentences should be taken into consideration in order to see and be able to
choose the best solution. It is also uncertain which term remains untouched, and it
depends on our decision which meaning is given up for the sake of other terms.
Fig. 4. The new subset created not apart from bachelors and saving the meaning of ‘hus-
bands’
The words or terms are not connected only to the extralinguistic world, but
to each other and they have further connections. Altering the truth value of one
sentence it seems to be unavoidable to modify the truth values of some other state-
ments. It suggests a picture of the language as not a tree rather more as a net or a
web.
Now it was an open question where to create the new subset of ‘man living in
a marriage with another man’. Having at least four cases to deal with this problem,
it seems plausible that the meaning does not govern this dynamic process. There is
no such an essence of the meaning that can guide us managing a new situation. The
lack of determinacy of meaning is not a question of vagueness, rather the question
and degree of lack of knowledge. The problem of statements is not that they claim
explicitly rather that they cannot. But this inability is not the question of vagueness.
Fig.5.
Having led up the alternative of Case#4 and Case#5 it could have seemed to
be difficult to defend it, because the truth value of statement (1) has to be altered
immediately. It was because we concentrated on the illustrative sentence (1), taken
from Quine. But it is also quite occasional that which sentence is in the centre of
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Fig. 5. The new subset created not apart from bachelors and the synonymy of ‘husbands’
and ‘married men’ is saved
our attention. Now let us turn our attention to the Hungarian translation of Quine’s
essay. F. Szabó István translated the sentence ‘No bachelor is married’ into the
sentence ‘Egyetlen agglegény sem no˝s’. I mean he did not give a bad solution, but
he took full advantage of the cognitive synonymy of terms of ‘n˝os’ and ‘married
man’. But there are differences between Hungarian and English. In English there
is not a word like ‘wifed’ (no˝s) or something else similar, so its negation (unwifed
= no˝tlen) cannot be formed either. But there is a pair of words in English (married,
unmarried) from which one can be translated into Hungarian, namely ‘married
man’ into ‘házas’, but not ‘unmarried man’ into ‘házatlan’. Therefore in different
languages different sets of statements can be declared. Following the Hungarian
illustrative sentence and considering the problem in Hungarian we would have faced
different problems. In such a case there is a sentence which remains true for all
examined cases. Considering the statement in Hungarian given by F. Szabó, there is
no reason to refuse Case#4 and Case#5 immediately at the moment of introducing
this alternative. The whole meaning of a term cannot be captured in one statement:
it is quite contingent that we have a sentence which does not alter its truth value in
every transformation or we have an ability to select it out from a set of statements
in advance. Although the last problem does not concern synonymy in a language
only concerns synonymy of terms between different languages it confirms that
the language is a system. The words or terms get their meanings in linguistic or
conceptual net. A case or a solution which are the best for a language cannot be
absolutely the same or even construed in another one. Different linguistic systems
can incorporate the same knowledge, but they have different problems handling
such a dynamic process scrutinised above.
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